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COMMENT
CREATION OR REALLOCATION OF INCOME UNDER
SECTION 482: A CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
by Robert R. Veach, Jr.
Businesses and taxpayers alike are entitled to organize their affairs so as
to expose -themselves to the least potential tax liability. One method of tax-
planning in a business enterprise might involve the use of functionally or ver-
tically integrated corporate structures, which would enable a parent corpora-
tion controlling all aspects of a business from manufacturing to distribution
to shift its income among its separate subsidiary corporations, thus availing
itself of the multiple surtax exemptions.' Or a corporation may form a for-
eign subsidiary and shift income -to that corporation to be taxed at a lower
foreign corporate tax rate.2 While the business and tax advantages of con-
ducting an enterprise in a multi-corporate form are numerous,' as taxpayers
find new methods of disguising their earnings Congress develops new perim-
eters to the definition of income under the tax laws. It is one of these con-
cepts of income which has created the controversy under section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code.4
Under section 482, reallocations of income and deductions can be made
by the Commissioner where, in his discretion, such are determined to be
necessary in order -to reflect clearly the income of related businesses or pre-
vent -the evasion of taxes through intercompany transactions within a multiple
corporate structure. This section, along with others,5 constitutes the Commis-
sioner's arsenal against the multitude of tax advantages available through
multiple corporate enterprises. In recent years, however, section 482 has
stepped to the forefront because the discretion allowed the Commissioner
under it is wide, and other more definitive sections have been avoided by
careful tax planning.6 Implementation of the section is contemplated where
1. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 15.01 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BrIrKER & EUSTICE].
2. The tax rates of foreign jurisdictions are generally much lower than under the
United States tax laws. See Lee, Section 482 and the Integrated Business Enterprise,
57 VA. L. REV. 1376 (1971). Tax advantages are also available in the form of a special
deduction granted to Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 921-22, and a special exclusion for the foreign-source income of a possessions
corporation under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 931.
3. See BIrTrKER & EusTiCE 15.01, 15.05; Eustice, Tax Problems Arising From
Transactions Between Affiliated or Controlled Corporations, 23 TAX L. REV. 451 (1968).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
5. A corporation may have its surtax exemption or its accumulated earnings credit
disallowed under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1551 where the Commissioner determines
that such corporation was created and its assets were transferred to it for purposes of
tax avoidance. Id. § 269 is also applicable to corporations acquired for tax avoidance
reasons, and credits or deductions realized by the acquisition can be disallowed under
its provisions. Further potential attacks on the multiple corporate structure can be
found in BIITKER & EUSTICE 111 15.01-.04.
6. See Asbill, The Application of Section 482 to Domestic Taxpayers-Current
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a taxpayer has shifted some of its income to another taxpayer where it pre-
sumably will be taxed at a lower rate or not at all. An actual shifting must
occur however; mere ability to do so by reason of a commonly controlled
group is not sufficient to call the section into operation.7
An important issue which arises in such circumstances is whether income
which is never realized can be shifted. When a parent corporation sells an
appreciated asset to a controlled subsidiary at cost, and the subsidiary re-
sells the asset to an uncontrolled third party at its appreciated value, the
profit realized by the subsidiary has clearly been shifted out of the parent
corporation. But if the subsidiary puts the appreciated asset to use within
its own business, it is questionable whether any income has been shifted
between the companies. The regulations under section 482 exhibit an af-
firmative position on the issue, despite considerable precedent to the con-
trary, discussed in Part I of this Comment. To obtain a clear reflection of the
income of each individual entity within the controlled group and to arrive
at their true taxable incomes, the regulations require application of an arm's
length standard to intercompany transactions." When a bargain sale or in-
terest-free loan is made between related parties which would not have oc-
curred had the parties dealt with each other as they would with uncontrolled
parties, such transactions will be regarded as income-generating events.
Thus, when acting under section 482's authority, regulation section 1.482-
1(d)(4) in effect allows -the Commissioner to create income for purposes
of allocating it to a particular enterprise in order clearly to reflect its income.9
This concept did not arise in the usual manner through enactment by Con-
gress; rather, it developed in the regulations issued in 1968 under circum-
stances which may not have warranted such an encompassing construction
of the section by the Treasury in light of past judicial interpretations. This
Comment will examine the legislative background of the section; its early
interpretation by the courts; the circumstances which prompted the promulga-
tion of the 1968 regulations; and their effect on today's tax law and judicial
decisions thereunder.
I. SECTION 482: ITS INCEPTION IN THE LAW
Under a deceivingly short section of the Internal Revenue Code, -the
Treasury has promulgated expansive regulations. While lengthy and de-
tailed, the regulations are essential to the administration of the vague au-
thority conferred in the one-sentence section, which states:
Status and Trends, U.S.C. 19TH INST. ON TAXATION 673 (1967); Johnson, Current Scope
of Commissioner's Power To Reallocate Income Under Section 482, 11 TAXATION FOR
ACCOUNTANTS 204 (Oct. 1973); Lee, supra note 2.
7. The Tax Court in Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), af'd, 358 F.2d 342
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966), said that in addition to common control
and the ability to shift income between the related members of the group, "there must
be . . . a distortion of income, and the Commissioner's power under the statute is lim-
ited to correct that distortion." 42 T.C. at 126. See note 66 infra.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (1968).
9. Language which creates this authority is found in the regulations, which provide
that "if one member of a group lends money to a second member of the group in a
taxable year, the district director may make an appropriate allocation to reflect an arm's
length charge for interest during such taxable year even if the second member does not
realize income during such year." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4) (1968).
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In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or in-
directly by the same interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distrib-
ute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allow-
ances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is neces-
sary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses. 10
To understand this section clearly, its legislative history, as well as the early
regulations under its predecessors, must be carefully examined.
A. The Antecedent of the Commissioner's Allocation Authority
The power of the Commissioner to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income" among related enterprises has its genesis in the early Code provisions
authorizing the consolidation of returns of related businesses.11 With the ad-
vent of the excess profits tax, which raised the corporation tax rate from six
percent in 1917 to a range of from twenty to sixty percent during World
War 1,12 the Treasury found the previously followed formalistic approach,
which treated each corporation as a separate entity regardless of its relation
to any other corporation, to be unrealistic.'3 Intercompany transactions, de-
signed merely to reduce the combined taxes of the related companies, soon
lost their appeal after the regulations providing for the filing of consolidated
returns were subsequently authorized by the enactment of section 240(d)
by Congress in 1921.14 Under this provision the Commissioner was em-
powered to consolidate the accounts of related businesses where necessary
"for the purpose of making an accurate distribution or apportionment of
gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital between or among such related
trades or businesses."' 5  The 1924 version of section 240(d) was substan-
tially the same except for minor rewording and the addition of authority for
invocation of its provisions by the taxpayer."" Section 240(d) was reen-
acted in 1926 as section 240(f) but its substantive provisions remained un-
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
11. The commentators are not in full accord as to whether INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 482 had its inception in § 240(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d),
42 Stat. 260 (see, e.g., DeKosmian, Section 482-Allocation of Income and Deductions
Among Controlled Taxpayers, 14 TULANE TAX INsT. 420 (1965); Lewis, Section 482:
An Eminently Amendable Provision, 25 ALA. L. REV. 23 (1972); Spaeth, Section 482-
Past and Future, 47 TAXES 45 (1969)), or whether its inception was in § 45 of the
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806 (see, e.g., Asbill, supra note 6; Jenks,
Treasury Regulations Under Section 482, 23 TAX LAW. 279 (1970)).
12. See Spaeth, supra note 11.
13. The formalistic approach treated each corporation as a separate entity regard-
less of its relation to any other corporation.
14. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 260. This was the beginning of the sin-
gle enterprise approach of Congress and the examination of transactions which might
cause a parent and subsidiary to be treated together for tax purposes. The regulations
issued under the War Revenue Act of 1917, Treas. Reg. 41, arts. 77, 78 (1918), were
retroactively approved of by Congress in the 1921 Act. See text accompanying notes
15-17 infra.
15. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 260.




Confusion then arose as to whether section 240 (f) of the 1926 Act permit-
ted controlled organizations to consolidate completely their income and de-
ductions, though they were not actually affiliated within the meaning of the
section.' 8 To alleviate this confusion, Congress enacted section 45 in the
1928 Act. 19 This section not only deleted the phrase "consolidate the ac-
counts," but also eliminated the taxpayer's right to invoke its provisions. 20
The House Ways and Means Committee in its report on the Revenue Act
of 1928 made the purpose behind section 45 clearer in an oft-quoted
passage:
Section 45 is based upon section 240(f) of the 1926 Act, broadened
considerably in order to afford adequate protection to the Government
made necessary by the elimination of the consolidated return provisions
of the 1926 Act. The section of the new bill provides that the Commis-
sioner may, in the case of two or more trades or businesses owned or
controlled by the same interests, apportion, allocate, or distribute the in-
come or deductions between or among them, as may be necessary in
order to prevent evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of ficti-
,tious sales, and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose of
'milking'), and in order clearly to reflect their true tax liability.21
Although minor amendments were made to section 45 in subsequent re-enact-
ments, it was substantially incorporated as section 482 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954.22
B. The Treasury Regulations
The regulations initially issued interpreting section 45 contained only gen-
eral terms framing the basic policy behind the section. 23  There were few
17. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 46.
18. This interpretation was expressly disapproved of by the House Ways and Means
Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), reprinted in 1939-1
(pt. 2) CuM. BULL. 384.
19. Section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806, provided:
In any case of two or more trades or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income or deductions between or among such trades or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is neces-
sary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
such trades or business.
20. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 148, 45 Stat. 806. The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee report on the 1928 Act stated: "It has been contended that section 240(f) of
the 1926 Act permits what is in effect the filing of a consolidated return by two or more
trades or businesses, even though they are not affiliated within the meaning of the sec-
tion. Section 45 of the bill prevents this erroneous interpretation by eliminating the
phrase 'consolidate the accounts.'" H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), re-
printed in 1939-1 (pt. 2) CuM. BULL. 384, 395.
21. H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
CuM. BULL. 384, 395.
22. In the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 695, the term "organizations" was
added by Congress to "remove any doubt as to the application of this section to all kinds
of business activity." H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in
1939-1 (pt. 2) CuM. BULL. 554, 572. Also in the Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, 58
Stat. 48, Congress added the words "credits, or allowances" to the section.
23. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 45-1 (1934).
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specific guidelines developed for the application of section 45 or its successor,
section 482, in their early years of existence. The regulations did, however,
indicate that the standard to be carried forward into section 482's application
was that of an "uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another
uncontrolled taxpayer. '24
In 1962 an effort was made to amend section 482 under the Revenue
Act of 1962, by adding a second section which would have set out strict
allocation procedures for intercompany sales between related domestic and
foreign businesses. 25 The Conference Committee, however, concurred with
the Senate Finance Committee and struck out the amendment, indicating that
the same objective could be accomplished by amending the existing regula-
tions.26 The committee referred to the broad authority already existing in
the section for the allocation of income and deductions, and directed the
Treasury to "explore the possibility of developing and promulgating regula-
tions under [that] authority which would provide additional guidelines and
formulas for the allocation of income and deductions in cases involving for-
eign income."127
The Treasury then, in 1966, initiated the extensive revision which eventu-
ally produced the regulations under section 482 which are currently in
force. 28 At the same time the Internal Revenue Service declared its policy
under section 482 to be that "adjustments will be proposed only in those
cases where there have been significant deviations from so-called arm's length
dealings-that is, dealings that would take place between unrelated com-
panies-or where there has been significant shifting of income."' 29 The new
regulations not only provided guidelines for allocations of domestic income
between commonly controlled domestic and foreign corporations but go well
beyond the scope of development envisioned by the Conference Committee
when it directed the Treasury to promulgate guidelines for cases involving
foreign income.30 One major innovation in the regulations was a new section
setting out several methods of allocation which could be used by the Commis-
sioner depending on "the substance of the particular transactions or arrange-
ments which result in the avoidance of taxes or the failure to clearly reflect
income. "31 At the heart of the "creation of income" controversy is one of
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (1968).
25. H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 28-30 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 402.
26. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM.
BULL. 1129.
27. Id. at 1147.
28. The preliminary regulations, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) dealing with al-
location methods, and Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 for determining taxable income
from loans and advances, performance of services, and the use of tangible property, came
out in 1965. 30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1965). In 1966 these were amplified and reproposed.
31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
29. Treasury Dept. Release, Aug. 2, 1966, reprinted in 7 CCH 1966 STAND. FED.
TAX REP. 6685. The final regulations came out in 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 5848 (1968),
and one section in 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 933 (1969).
30. Several commentators on § 482 have advanced this opinion. See, e.g., Jenks, su-
pra note 11, at 280; Spaeth, supra note 11, at 46; and Comment, Recent "Extensions"
of Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 3 MEMPHIS STATE L. REV. 106, 109
(1972).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1) (1968). The basic methods are set out as five
[Vol. 28
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these methods of allocation. The Commissioner is empowered by it to make
allocations in the case of related parties, where they are not dealing at arm's
length with each other, despite the fact that the income being allocated is
not realized during the taxable year in question or at any future time.3 2
However, before looking at the added provisions of the current regulations
in more depth, it is necessary to examine the judicial interpretation of the
congressional intent behind section 45 and section 482 in the intervening
years between their inception and the promulgation of these regulations by
the Treasury.
C. Initial Interpretation of Sections 45 and 482
The broad language utilized by Congress in section 45 required the courts
to give definitive boundaries to the terms of the statute and the scope of
the Commissioner's discretion thereunder. In Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Com-
missioner33 the court found that tax avoidance transactions in which taxable
income was transferred from a domestic subsidiary of a foreign parent to
a foreign subsidiary of the parent fell within the Commissioner's authority
to allocate income in order to prevent "evasion of taxes." The question also
arose as to whether the terms of the statute could authorize an allocation
of the net income from transactions between related entities when the Com-
missioner's authority was to allocate gross income.3 4  The cases initially re-
fused to authorize the allocation of net income by the Commissioner. 5
However, in Ballentine Motor Co. 3 6 the Tax Court held that in a proper
case net income could be allocated by the Commissioner as a shortcut ap-
proach to allocating gross income. The court rejected the Chelsea Products,
Inc.37 rationale which did not allow such allocations of net income, reasoning
general subsections of id. § 1.482-1(d). Under id. § 1.482-1(d)(2) the Commissioner
must make correlative adjustments to the other members of the group from which any
allocation is made, "[t]hus, if the district director makes an allocation of income, he
shall not only increase the income of one member of the group, but shall decrease the
income of the other member if such adjustment would have an effect on the United
States income tax liability of the other member for any pending taxable year." Consid-
eration must also be given to other offsetting transactions between the parties, id. § 1.-
482-1(d)(3). Adjustments can be made regardless of whether the income being al-
located has been realized, id. § 1.482-1(d)(4). Section 482 may be applied in circum-
stances where there otherwise would be no recognized gain or loss, id. § 1.482-1(d)(5).
And id. § 1.482-1(d)(6) provides, for a taxpayer electing the deferred income method
of accounting, the option of treating allocations, with respect to transactions where the
payment was not made due to restrictions of a foreign country, as deferable income. For
a perceptive analysis of each of these methods, see Jenks, supra note 11, at 281-92.
In addition, guidelines were established in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1968) for determin-
ing an organization's taxable income in five specific areas: loans or advances; per-
formance of services; use of tangible property; transfer or use of intangible property;
and sales of tangible property. See Hammer, Section 482-Apportionment and Alloca-
tion Guidelines, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 693 (1968).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4) (1968); see note 9 supra, and note 56 inlra.
33. 79 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935). The court also
noted at one point the Commissioner's authority to allocate gross income, and that
"[i]f there is no gross income, there is nothing to allocate." Id. at 237.
34. See Hewitt, Section 482-Reallocation of Income and Deductions Between Re-
lated Persons-Up to Date, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAX. 381, 388 (1964).
35. The leading case was Chelsea Prods., Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d
620 (3d Cir. 1952). See also T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957).
36. 39 T.C. 348 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1963).
37. 16 T.C. 840 (1951).
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that an allocation of net income is merely the allocation of gross income and
deductions."
The fundamental question in this article which has been at issue for more
than thirty years is whether the Commissioner can "create income" for pur-
poses of allocating it -to a related business where it does not exist or has not
been realized outside of the related group. 39  In several early cases, the
courts were faced with this issue in a number of different situations, including
the rent-free use of equipment; a gratuitous transfer of oil payments; interest-
free loans; and the sale of supplies at cost.
Rent-Free Use of Equipment. In Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Com-
missioner40 the taxpayer was a Tennessee corporation originally organized
to recover sand and gravel from the Mississippi River; the recovered materi-
als were then sold in part to the highway departments of Arkansas and Louis-
iana. In 1933, following a policy decision by the Mississippi Highway
Department that Mississippi bidders would be favored on the state's new road
building contracts, a new corporation owned and controlled by the same in-
terests as the Tennessee corporation was formed in Mississippi. A lease of
the taxpayer's river equipment to the Mississippi corporation for 1933 was
subsequently arranged at a rental of $1000 per month, but due to the operat-
ing losses of the affiliate, the rental was not paid and by oral agreement
none was accrued for that year. Further, because of an expensive location
change in the Mississippi corporation's operations, no charge was to be made
for the rental of the equipment in 1934. The Commissioner, acting under
section 45, assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer for the $12,000 rental
income it was entitled to have charged and received from the Mississippi
corporation in 1934.4 1
In reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Commissioner's authority extended no further than to "distrib-
ute, apportion or allocate gross income" and in this case he had failed to
38. This is still an unsettled question as the cases have come out on both sides since
the Ballentine decision. The allocation of net income was sustained in Wisconsin Big
Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971), and Hamburgers York Road,
Inc., 41 T.C. 821 (1964). But see W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1968); Interior Sec. Corp., 38 T.C. 330 (1962). See also Hewitt, supra note 38,
at 388-91, and Lewis, supra note 14, at 52-56. The Ballentine decision also seems to
indicate a section 482 allocation may be made even in the case of an arm's length trans-
action if there is a tax-avoidance motive underlying it. Clearly the section applies where
there is an obvious distortion of income regardless of the presence of a tax avoidance
motive. Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Dillard-Walter-
mire, Inc. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1958); Central Cuba Sugar Co. v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
39. The question was decided against the Commissioner in 1940 by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508
(6th Cir. 1940), The release of the Internal Revenue Service List of Prime Issues, July
16, 1973, under the new Freedom of Information Act, included section 482. See 9 CCH
1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (1973 Rulings, 71,415) 6632. A prime issue is one the
Service will litigate rather than concede or compromise.
40. 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940), rev'g a B.T.A. memorandum decision of June
30, 1938, CCH DEC. 10,073-D.
41. It is not clear whether the Mississippi affiliate had either gross or net income
for 1934 but it did have gross receipts in excess of the $12,000 rental charge. The
Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner on the basis that the taxpayer failed
to show its gross income was any less than its gross receipts. CCH DEC. 10,073-D.
[Vol. 28
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allocate any of the Mississippi corporation's gross income to the taxpayer.
The Sixth Circuit indicated two premises for its decision, one substantially
clear on its face and followed by subsequent Tax Court decisions, and an-
other abstracted from the choice of words in the opinion, but advocated now
by the Commissioner and promulgated in the regulations. Clearly the court
was holding that income not actually realized by a member of the related
group from dealings with outside parties stemming from the original inter-
company transaction could not be created and allocated to one member of
the group. With reference to section 45, the court stated it "did not au-
thorize the Commissioner to set up income where none existed. The princi-
pal purpose of the section was to clearly reflect income that did exist."'42 But
the Commissioner would contend this decision was merely a result of the fail-
ure in this case to actually allocate gross income and grant a corresponding
deduction. The Commissioner in the Tennessee case had merely concluded
that rent should have been charged, and ignored the actual business situa-
tion and the effect of a deduction for such expense to the subsidiary. 43
Gratuitous Transfer of Oil Payments. In E.C. Laster v. Commissioner44 the
taxpayer owned all of the stock of two corporations. One corporation, Ret-
sal, owned oil leases and the other, Laster, owned certain oil payments bur-
dening the leases of Retsal which it transferred to Retsal without any con-
sideration. Acting under section 45 the Commissioner included the fair mar-
ket value of the oil payments in the gross income of Laster as a forgiveness
of indebtedness. The Board did not agree, however, and held that the gra-
tuitous transfer to the Retsal Drilling Co. of the oil payments did not result
in income either to it, or to the transferor, and thus there was no income
upon which section 45 could operate.45 Thus, a clear precedent developed
supplementing section 45, which limited the Commissioner's authority to al-
locate income to cases in which such income actually existed. 46
Interest-Free Loans. The position of the Tax Court was further established
in Smith-Bridgman & Co. 47 In this case a parent corporation, Continental
Dept. Stores, borrowed funds from one of its subsidiaries, Smith-Bridgman,
in an amount sufficient to retire its outstanding debenture bonds. The funds
42. 112 F.2d at 510. The Commissioner originally concurred in this decision. But
see note 60 inf ra.
43. 112 F.2d at 510. This is thought by some to be an early indication of the ne-
cessity of making correlative adjustments. It is on this basis that the Commissioner later
explained his concurrence to the case. See text accompanying note 60 infra. See also
Cohen, Section 482: Treasury's Efforts To Teach an Old Dog Some New Tricks, 43
TAXES 835, 839 (1965); Jenks, The "Creation of Income" Doctrine: A Comment on
the Proposed Section 482 Regulations, 43 TAXES 486 (1965); Mansfield, The
482 Proposed Regs: The Problems with Which Practitioners Will Have To Contend,
28 J. TAX. 66, 70 (1968).
44. 43 B.T.A. 159, 177 (1940), acquiesced in, 1941-1 CuM. BULL. 7.
45. Id.
46. In another early case, Epsen Lithographers v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181, 190
(D. Neb. 1946), the court, in discussing the application of § 45 to a corporation which
was renting equipment to a similarly controlled partnership at allegedly inadequate rates,
made reference to "the rule that Section 45 does not authorize the Commissioner to set
up or create income where none exists."
47. 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 3. But see text accom-
panying note 60 infra as to this acquiescence.
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were provided by the taxpayer for its parent corporation's non-interest bear-
ing demand notes. These loans were made at a time when the parent was
receiving interest income itself on a loan by it to another subsidiary. Thus,
Continental received interest-free loans from Smith-Bridgman enabling it to
redeem its outstanding interest-bearing bonds, while at the same time another
subsidiary was paying interest to it on a previous loan. The Commissioner
added interest to Smith-Bridgman Co.'s income under section 45, in an
amount representing a four percent interest rate on the moneys loaned by
it to its parent corporation. The Commissioner argued that in order to pre-
vent the evasion of taxes and to reflect clearly the income of the related
businesses such allocation was necessary. Not only was Continental relieved
of the interest expense on its former outstanding bonds, but also it could have
loaned these funds to others at four percent interest. Nevertheless, the Tax
Court held the Commissioner's action improper and, relying on several earlier
cases, said:
The decisions involving section 45 make it clear that its principal pur-
pose is to prevent -the manipulation of or improper shifting of gross in-
come and deductions between two or more organizations, trades or busi-
nesses. Its application is predicated on the existence of income. The
courts have consistently refused to interpret section 45 as authorizing the
creation of income out of a transaction where no income was realized
by any of the commonly controlled businesses. 48
The court indicated further that the record clearly established the Commis-
sioner's failure to make any allocation of existing income. 40 The Comnis-
sioner had made no adjustment to the income or deductions of the parent
when the interest income was allocated to its subsidiary. The Commissioner
contended the adjustment was unnecessary since during the taxable year in
question the parent corporation had no net income. The court noted that
as net income was received by the parent in the following year, a net operat-
ing loss carry forward could have been utilized. Therefore, for the court
to allow an allocation, an adjustment must be made to the party from whom
the income is being shifted, either decreasing its taxable income or increasing
its operating loss which could be utilized to offset the income of other tax
years.5o
Sale of Supplies at Cost. Under entirely different factual circumstances in
Texsun Supply Corp.,51 the Commissioner again allocated income under his
authority in section 45, from a parent to its subsidiary. In this case the
parent was a nonprofit cooperative supplying its members with materials re-
lated to -their processing and packing of citrus fruit, and for this purpose ac-
quired a box manufacturing subsidiary. The taxpayer would receive the
packing crates manufactured by its new subsidiary, at their actual cost and
48. Id. at 293, citing Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d
508 (6th Cir. 1940); Epsen-Lithographers, Inc. v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181 (D. Neb.
1946); E.C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159, modilied on other issues, 128 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1942).
49. The court said the Commissioner had actually "created or attributed income
where none in fact existed." 16 T.C. at 294.
50. See notes 58-61 in/ra.
51. 17 T.C. 433 (1951), acquiesced in, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
[Vol. 28
COMMENT
then, as required by its bylaws, provide them to its members at the prevailing
O.P.A. price at that time. At the end of each fiscal year the cooperative
corporation would make a rebate to each member of the excess of the pur-
chase price of its supplies over their cost to the cooperative, in an amount
reduced by the member's proportionate share of the total overhead and
operating costs of the parent corporation. Thus, under such an arrangement
no income was actually derived from the sale of supplies to the members.
The Tax Court noted that any gross income to be allocated to the manu-
facturing subsidiary would have to come from another organization: the co-
operative parent. Finding the parent to have no gross income subject to al-
location, 52 the court held the Commissioner's action to be unauthorized by
section 45.53
It is in light of these precedents in the case law that the regulations promul-
gated by the Treasury, and now being consistently applied by the Commis-
sioner, must be viewed with respect -to their validity on the "creation of in-
come" issue.54
II. THE COMMISSIONER AND REGULATION 1.482-1(d) (4)
VERSUS THE TAX COURT
While the early cases consistently held the Commissioner's authority under
52. Id. at 445.
53. The court found that the parent cooperative was obligated by law under its by-
laws to rebate the gross income, which the Commissioner was attempting to allocate to
the manufacturing subsidiary, to its member organizations. For § 45 to authorize an
allocation under such circumstance would "require legislation by Congress." Id.
54. After the proposed regulations came out, continuing to the present, commenta-
tors have felt the regulations were to some extent inconsistent with the statute, that the
section itself needed amending, or at least with regard to certain of the regulations that
their method of application should be reconsidered.
In his article commenting on the proposed regulations in 1965, Jenks examined the
regulation permitting the creation of income, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4), 30
Fed. Reg. 4256 (1965) and questioned the assumption on which the examples of such
allocations, which appeared in the regulations, were based. He also raised the question
of whether the taxation of imputed income was constitutionally valid as a taxation of
income under the sixteenth amendment, or as an excise tax. It is also questionable
whether support for such a tax could be found under the legislative history of the sec-
tion. See Jenks, supra note 43, 490-93. Mansfield examined the effect of the proposed
regulations on practitioners in a 1968 article and said with regard to the creation of in-
come authorized therein: "Indeed, the proposed Regulations might be taken to indicate
that an allocation, if it can be called that, of gross income can be effected even where
the recipient has no gross income from any source. If the proposed Regulations do pur-
port to go this far, they would seem, in this respect at least, to have gone beyond the
authority granted by the statute." See Mansfield, supra note 43, at 71.
In an examination of the proposed regulations in the 19th U.S.C. Institute on Taxa-
tion, Asbill found the case law on the creation of income issue prior to the promulgation
of the regulations sufficiently convincing, to state: "It seems doubtful whether the ap-
proach taken by the Proposed Regulations will stand the test of litigation." Asbill, supra
note 6, at 696. He felt the regulations in this regard were a "legislative extension of
the scope of Section 482." Id. at 696-97.
Eustice's view of the creation of income under the proposed regulations was that the
tax imposed after reallocation but before the income was actually realized through a
transaction with a party outside of the related group resulted in the acceleration of in-
come as well as its reallocation. "Perhaps the most equitable solution to this problem
of timing would be to suspend application of the section 482 adjustment until such time
as the related group finally geperates the particular gross income or loss from its activi-
ties through dealing with outsiflers." Eustice, supra note 3, at 490-91. A recent article
called for a broad reform of the section having found "[v]irtually every major aspect
of section 482 [to contain] an inherent inadequacy." See Lewis, Section 482: An
Eminently Amendable Provision, 25 ALA. L. REv. 23, 72 (1972).
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section 45 did not extend to the "creation of income," 55 the Treasury clearly
wrote such authority into regulation 1.482-1(d)(4), which allows allocations
"notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate income anticipated from a series
of transactions may not be realized or is realized during a later period." 56
Thus, if in an economic sense some benefit can be ascribed to any transaction
between related businesses which would not have arisen if they were dealing
at arm's length, the Commissioner may add an appropriate amount of income
to the party benefiting therefrom whether or not there ever is any actual
income in an accounting sense realized by the other business, from which
the allocation could be made.5 7
A. The 1968 Regulations
By way of compromise, the Treasury added -the concept of making correl-
ative adjustments. Where income is to be allocated under section 482 from
one member of the group to another, the Commissioner must make a cor-
responding adjustment to the party from which the income is derived.58 This
addition to the regulations would seem the most logical of any in light of
the terms of the section itself. Obviously a reallocation of income has a
mutual effect, as the Tax Court has noted.59 It was on this basis that the
Commissioner explained his long-standing acquiescence to the Smith-Bridg-
man case and his concurrence to the Tennessee-Arkansas case. 60  Whether
the court in Smith-Bridgman relied on the absence of such corresponding ad-
justments in making its decision is questionable, particularly with the empha-
sis placed by the court on the lack of authority in the section for the "creation
55. See Aland, Section 482: 1971 Version, 49 TAXES 815 (1971); Cooper, "Section
45," 4 TAX L. REV. 131 (1948); Holzman, "Arm's Length Transactions and
45," 25 TAXES 389 (1947); Sherman, "A Case History of Section 45," 29 TAXES 13
(1951).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4) (1968). The section continues giving an example
regarding a sale at less than an arm's length price between related parties and the au-
thority to make an "appropriate allocation to reflect an arm's length price for the sale
of the product in the first taxable year, notwithstanding that the second member of the
group had not realized any gross income from the resale of the product in the first year."
Id. A second example is given regarding the allocation of interest income. The section
concludes with, "[t]he provisions of this subparagraph apply even if the gross income
contemplated from a series of transactions is never, in fact, realized by the other mem-
bers." Id.
57. Such action would seem to ignore the accounting realities of the situation by
recognizing income for taxation prior to its realization. But taxation of such economic
benefits under § 482 does have support outside the regulations. See, e.g., Hewitt, supra
note 34, at 398-400; Eustice, supra note 3, at 469.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2) (1968) states, "[wihenever the district director
makes [primary] adjustments to the income of one member of a group of controlled
taxpayers . . . he shall also make appropriate correlative adjustments to the income of
any other member of the group involved in the allocation."
59. See Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-1 CUM.
BULL. 3, and text accompanying note 49 supra.
60. In Rev. Rul 67-79, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 117, also released as T.I.R. 838, Aug. 2,
1966, the Commissioner, in conjunction with the release of the proposed regulations un-
der section 482, restated his position on his acquiescence and concurrence to two cases
seemingly diametrically opposed to the new regulations. "The acquiescence in Smith-
Bridgman & Co. was intended only to concur in the proposition that appropriate ad-justments are to be made to the incomes of both memberp of the group affected to re-
flect the allocation." 1967-1 CuM. BULL. at 118. The concurrence to Tennessee-
Arkansas Gravel Co. was explained similarly. The Tax Court would not be bound by




The purpose of section 482 as indicated in the regulations is:
[T]o place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled
taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled
taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and business of a
controlled taxpayer. . . . The standard to be applied in every case is
,that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another
uncontrolled taxpayer. 62
At this point it might be questioned whether Congress intended that a cor-
poration be forced to deal with a related corporation on the same basis it
would deal with its competitors. 63 The long line of cases denying the Com-
missioner's authority to create income between related corporations and the
Commissioner's acquiescence thereto should not be overlooked in view of the
inaction of Congress on this issue.6 4
In addition, the regulations indicate that transactions between related tax-
61. The Tax Court in Huber Homes, 55 T.C. 598 (1971), see text accompanying
notes 70-75 infra, examined the basis of the Commissioner's explanation in Rev. Rul.
67-79. As to the Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. case, the court said:
The Commissioner seeks to distinguish the Tennessee-Arkansas case on
the ground that the decision was based on the Commissioner's failure to
make a correlative adjustment to the income or deductions of the related
entity. We think, however, that the Sixth Circuit's decision rests on a
broader ground: that the allocation under section 482 must be of income
actually realized by a member of the controlled group.
55 T.C. at 608. The Commissioner in Huber Homes also contended as in Rev. Rul 67-
79 that the court in Smith-Bridgman noted the absence of a correlative adjustment to
the related party in that case, and the decision was premised on that fact. But the Tax
Court in Huber disagreed and said, "[w]e view this factor as no more than a possible
supporting ground for the decision and not the controlling reason." Id. at 610. See
also Jenks, supra note 43, at 489.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1968). See also Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Com-
missioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1952). The idea of finding the "true taxable income"
of a taxpayer is hardly meaningful in an accounting sense as there is no one "true in-
come" figure. See Nicholson, Intercompany Accounting Among Related Companies:
Maintaining Proper Records to Meet Section 482, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
665 (1968).
63. The Commissioner made this absolute arm's length standard clear in an article
on how the proposed regulations would be administered. Therein he stated, "[a]ll we
ask of taxpayers is that they set prices with their affiliates as if they were dealing with
a stranger." Cohen, How the I.R.S. Intends to Administer the New Regulations Under
Section 482, 28 J. TAX. 73, 74 (1968). In the Eighth Annual Tax Conference of the
University of Pennsylvania, Spaeth examined the "arm's length" standard under section
482 and the nature of its effect on the business community. Following an examination
of the section and its early regulations leading up to the 1968 regulations, he said "the
idea of requiring related corporations to deal with each other on the same basis as unre-
lated companies (which almost necessarily means competing companies) seems to go far
beyond the intentions of Congress and also seems to be completely removed from the
facts of life." Spaeth, supra note 11, at 49. An application of the regulations in a fac-
tual situation such as that in Texsun, see text accompanying notes 51-53 supra, would
require allocating a manufacturing profit from the parent cooperative corporation to the
newly acquired manufacturing subsidiary. "This result, of course, does not clearly reflect
income; it distorts it. It also defies common sense." Jenks, supra note 43, at 490.
64. In Emphrey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), the court con-
cluded the Treasury Regulations dealing with the Kintner plan were inconsistent with
the statute and the judicial construction thereof, and as they therefore constituted the
exercise of a non-delegable legislative function, they were invalid and unenforceable,
stating: "There appears to be no case law to the contrary and Congress has not seen
fit to take any legislative action to repudiate this uniform and long-standing judicial con-
struction of the statute." Id. at 853.
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payers will be subject to "special scrutiny" '65 and the application of the sec-
tion may 'be extended even to innocent transactions or those undertaken with
a valid business purpose. 66 The regulations promulgated by the Treasury
must of course withstand the tests of litigation and initially it seemed regula-
tion 1.482-1(d)(4) might fail.0 7
B. Post-Regulation Decisions by the Tax Court
The Commissioner tested his new authority in P.P.G. Industries, Inc.,6e
wherein he proposed a correlative adjustment in order to reallocate interest
income on an interest free loan from a corporation to its wholly-owned for-
eign subsidiary. One of the Commissioner's problems, however, was the fact
that the loan was made in 1940 and the subsidiary did not realize any in-
come until 1960. The Tax Court relied on Smith-Bridgman and reinforced
the position it had taken before the regulations came out, indicating that
there had to be income clearly arising from and related to the transaction
for there to be any allocation.69
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968). See also Local Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner,
407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969).
66. The Commissioner in clarifying the spirit under which § 482 would be applied
stated, "[i]t is not a Section which is limited in application to instances of conscious
tax avoidance or evasion." See Cohen, supra note 63, at 74. The courts have inter-
preted the section to encompass transactions with tax avoidance motives as well as those
for the evasion of taxes. See Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d
Cir. 1935). But the extension to transactions entered for a valid business purpose
might be questioned for its support in the section itself or legislative support in its his-
tory. Many of the cases under this section refer to the requirement of an actual "dis-
tortion of income," Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114, 126 (1964), ajI'd, 358 F.2d 342
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966), or to an "actual shifting of income," V.H.
Monette & Co., 45 T.C. 15, 37 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 374 F.2d 116 (4th Cir.
1967). See also Bush Hog Mfg. Co., 42 T.C. 713 (1964). And in Simon J. Murphy
Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 639, 644 (6th Cir. 1956), the court, citing the Tennes-
see-Arkansas case on the creation of income question said:
The foregoing cases point out that the basic purpose of the statute to
recognize the normal tax effect of bona fide business transactions between
separate organizations, even though controlled by the same interests, but
to enable the Commissioner to change the bookkeeping effect of a trans-
action between controlled taxpayers when, by reason of the relationship,
they arbitrarily or improperly shift income or deductions from one organi-
zation to the other. . . . The Commissioner is not authorized to transfer
income or deductions from one controlled organization to another, unless,
by reason of the relationship the original distribution between the two en-
tities, as reflected by the books, is in substance a fictitious one, improp-
erly reflecting form instead of substance.
In this regard the precept noted by the court of appeals in W. Braun Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 396 F.2d 264, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1968), would seem relevant: "[A] taxpayer is
not required to adopt or continue with that form of organization which results in the
maximum tax upon business income and that when a taxpayer chooses to conduct his
business in a certain form, the tax collector may not deprive him of the incidental tax
benefits flowing therefrom, unless it first be found to be but a fiction or a sham."
67. The Treasury Regulations must be shown to be unreasonable and plainly incon-
sistent with the revenue statutes to be declared invalid. See Sanford v. Commissioner,
412 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 841 (1969). The Tax Court in
Huber Homes came close to ruling on their validity but found instead that the factual
situation presented was outside the scope of section 482. See text accompanying notes
70-75 infra.
68. 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
69. This would seem to be the origin of the tracing concept now ascribed to by the
tax court. The court in P.P.G. stated:
We need not decide whether respondent may, under the authority of
section 482, make an allocation of income which is indistinguishable from
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In Huber Homes, Inc.70 the Tax Court soundly rejected the allocation of
income where none was yet realized, but the court did not rule on the valid-
ity of the regulations as it was thought that the factual situation there was
outside that contemplated by section 482. 71 The case involved a sale of
houses built by the parent corporation, which was engaged in the construc-
tion and sale of homes, to a subsidiary engaged in the real estate rental
business. The homes were sold to the subsidiary at their actual cost and
were then rented out to the general public. The Commissioner allocated as
income to the parent the difference between the houses' fair market value
and their actual cost, and increased the subsidiary's basis in the homes. In
this manner the sale would be on arm's length terms and the income of both
corporations would be clearly reflected. The Tax Court, viewing the trans-
action in its true terms, noted that the houses were not resold by -the sub-
sidiary, thus shifting profits normally received by the parent to the subsidi-
ary.7 2 Rather the houses were the source of rental income to the subsidiary
and -the Commissioner did not -assert that any of such rental income was at-
tributable to the parent. 73
This decision, believed by some commentators at the time to be the crip-
pling blow to the Commissioner's position with respect to the creation of in-
come, 74 was not appealed by the Commissioner, probably because it would
have been reviewed by the Sixth Circuit and the Tennessee-Arkansas deci-
sion would likely have been held to be controlling, thus adding further weight
to the list of authorities contrary to the Commissioner's position. 75
the imputation of an interest charge. Our concern here is whether section
482 can be applied at all under the circumstances of this case .... We
cannot possibly conceive even the most tenuous connection between this
1940 balance [of loans and advances to the subsidiary and the subsidi-
ary's] income some 20 years later ....
55 T.C. at 1009.
70. 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
71. "In deciding that section 482 is inapplicable here we do not reach the question
whether the regulations . . . relied upon by the Commissioner are valid. They plainly
contemplate a situation where one member of a controlled group sells to another at less
than fair market value and where it is expected that the controlled vendee would in turn
zesell the product to a third party." 55 T.C. at 610. The court determined the Huber
case to be beyond this as there was no intention on the subsidiary's part to resell the
houses after the transfer.
72. The Tax Court conceded that if goods or services were transferred to a related
party and by their "use or consumption" income was realized by the controlled group,
a different question would be presented. In the Huber case, however, the homes after
their transfer did "not appear to be productive of any net income whatever." Id.
73. The Commissioner does not here contend that any of Huber Invest-
ment's gross rental income was not earned by it or that any portion of its
income should be allocated to Huber Homes. Rather, the Commissioner
is purporting to exercise his authority under section 482 to create income,
i.e., to charge petitioners with the income it would have realized had its
sale to Huber Investment been at arm's length. We hold that this deter-
mination is not authorized by section 482.
Id. at 607.
74. In analyzing the Huber Homes decision, Lewis indicated that the proper course
for the Service, when its Code no longer accomplishes the desired purpose, is to seek
a new provision from Congress rather than rewriting the present provision to meet its
own interpretation. He then said, "[i]t may well be that the Huber Homes case will
have the beneficial effect of sending the Service back to Congress to present its case
for an absolute arm's-length standard." Lewis, Tax Court in Huber Homes Holds that
the IRS May Not Use 482 To Create Income, 34 J. TAX. 208 (1971).
75. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
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III. OVERRIDING OLD PRECEDENTS
A. The Second Circuit's View
In B. Forman Co. 76 two competing department stores operating in down-
town Rochester, New York, were concerned about the growth of outlying
stores. In order to stem the tide of shoppers to the suburban shopping cen-
ters, the two corporations decided to build and develop jointly a midtown
shopping center which would adjoin both of their stores and have a mall
in between for smaller shops. The development of the mall was through
a new corporation owned by the two department store corporations, Forman
and McCurdy. These two corporations each made an interest-free loan of
$1,000,000 to the new corporation. The Commissioner allocated $50,000
of interest income to Forman and McCurdy for these interest-free loans un-
der the authority of section 482. The Tax Court held the use of section
482 by the Commissioner in this instance was improper, since the new cor-
poration and the taxpayers were not controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
same interests. In so holding, the Tax Court never reached the issue of
whether the Commissioner could create income by allocating interest income.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 77 noting the
flexibility inherent in the regulation's definition of control, 7s found Forman
and McCurdy to be in reality jointly controlling their new corporation, and
that section 482's control requirement was met. Having established the tech-
nical applicability of section 482 to the taxpayers, the court then had to deal
with the creation of income question not faced by the Tax Court. The court
referred to the strict scrutiny given to transactions between related taxpayers
and the applicability of the section to innocent as well as sham transactions
and held the Commissioner's reallocation to be necessary to properly reflect
the income of the three corporations. 79 The taxpayers asserted that Ten-
nessee-Arkansas Gravel Co., Smith-Bridgman & Co., and P.P.G. Industries
all held that no imputation of interest income could be made where no inter-
est was created. However, the court rejected this premise and said in re-
sponse:
To the extent that the above cases cited by taxpayers may be read
as holding that no interest can be allocated under § 482 under the facts
of this case, they are not in accord with 'either economic reality, or with
:the declared purpose of section 482. They seriously impair the useful-
ness of § 482. Those cases may be correct from a pure accounting
standpoint. Nevertheless, interest income may be added to taxpayers'
incomes, as long as a correlative adjustment is made .... 80
76. 54 T.C. 912 (1970).
77. 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 54 T.C. 912
(1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). 1
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3) (1968).
79. 453 F.2d at 1155. The court stressed the absolute arm's length requirement of
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968) and stated that a finding that the waiver of interest
by Forman and McCurdy on their loans was not in accordance with normal dealings
at arm's length between uncontrolled parties was necessary to sustain the Commis-
sioner's allocation.
80. 453 F.2d at 1156.
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Thus, the court upheld the Commissioner's allocation 8l upon the rationale
that as a matter of economic reality an arm's length loan of this size would
certainly involve an interest charge. The court stated that the regulations
which allow such an allocation are "entirely consistent with the scope and
purpose of section 482."82
B. Rejection of Forman
In Kerry Investment Co.83 and The Kahler Corp.84 the Tax Court rejected
the Second Circuit's reasoning in the Forman case. 85 The Commissioner
took two different approaches in the two cases. In Kerry the Commissioner
followed the tracing theory, previously advanced by the tax court in P.P.G.
Industries and Huber Homes,8 0 to establish the use of the interest-free funds
loaned to a subsidiary by the Kerry Company. Insofar as the Commissioner
argued that an allocation of income should be made where the borrower
realizes income from the use of interest-free funds, the Tax Court agreed.
Thus, the issue in the case became one of tracing the proceeds of the loan.
In certain transactions the use and result was clear, as when the funds loaned
-to the subsidiary by Kerry bearing no interest were then loaned to a third
party at six percent interest.8 7 However, in other instances the use to which
the funds were put was not clear, and following the normal rule as to the
taxpayer's burden of proof,88 the court sustained the Commissioner's alloca-
tion again, because the taxpayer -had failed to show a non-income producing
use of the funds.89
81. The court also completely rejected the taxpayers' alternative contention that the
loans were in fact capital contributions.
82. 453 F.2d at 1156.
83. 58 T.C. 479 (1972).
84. 58 T.C. 496 (1972).
85. See Barnett, Tax Law Notes, 46 FLA. B.J. 607 (1972); Crawford, Tax Court
in Two New 482 Decisions Refuses To "Create" Income, but Okays Reallocations, 37
J. TAX. 277 (1972).
86. See notes 68-75 supra.
87. 58 T.C. at 486. This would seem to be the primary type of shifting of income
contemplated by § 482. It is analogous to a parent selling property to a subsidiary at
a bargain price and the subsidiary then immediately reselling it to an unrelated third
party at a profit. The profit clearly belongs to the parent in such case and the Commis-
sioner has the power to reallocate the income realized by the subsidiary. Asiatic Pe-
troleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), aff'g 31 B.T.A. 1152, cert. denied,
296 U.S. 645 (1935); Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
See also J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 38.61, at 159 (1967).
88. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935), established the precedent that the
taxpayer has the burden of proving the Commissioner's determination is erroneous. Id.
at 515. With respect to § 482, the court in R.T. French Co., 60 T.C. 836 (1973), re-
cently had to examine the taxpayer's burden of proof under § 482 and it reaffirmed the
standard established by Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114, 126 (1964), that "[the] Commis-
sioner has considerable discretion in applying this section and his determinations must
be sustained unless he has abused his discretion. We may reverse his determinations
only where the taxpayer proves them to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious."
G.U.R. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941); Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C.
231 (1951); National Sec. Corp., 46 B.T.A. 562 (1942). See also Burke, Multi-Cor-
porate Operations: Joint Use of Assets, Management and Employees, N.Y.U. 30TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1283, 1292 (1972).
89. It was thought that placing the burden on the taxpayer to show the funds could
be traced to nonproductive assets was consistent with the general burden of proof re-
quirements and would also encourage the maintenance of accurate records. But see text
accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
As to the funds which were clearly invested in non-income producing as-
sets, the court rejected the reallocation,9" noting that the court of appeals
in Forman seemed to indicate an allocation could be made regardless of the
borrower's income during the tax year and its holding in Huber Homes.91
The court carefully considered its prior decisions and made clear the fact
that in Smith-Bridgman the borrowing corporation had no gross income as
a result of the loan and the Commissioner had made no attempt to reallocate
its income; rather, the income of the lender was merely increased without
a corresponding adjustment to the borrower.92 Huber Homes was distin-
guished to the extent that there the Commissioner failed to show the sales
transaction generated the income he had allocated. 93 And in P.P.G. Indus-
tries there was also a failure on the Commissioner's part to establish any
link between the interest-free loan and the income earned twenty years
later.9 4
In a concurring opinion to Kerry Investment, Judge Irwin, who wrote the
majority opinion to -the Kahler case, made clear the distinction between the
two cases and the holding in each.9 5 He stated that Kerry was the first
instance where section 482 was applied to an "improper deflection of income
caused by the use or consumption of interest-free advances." 96  In Kahler,
however, the Commissioner merely attempted to allocate nonexistent income
per se.
The Kahler Corp. case involved interest-free loans by the parent taxpayer
to four of its subsidiaries which in turn utilized the funds for working capital.
The Commissioner allocated interest income on the outstanding balances.
Citing its previous holdings for the authority that the realization of income
from the particular inter-company transaction was an absolute prerequisite
to any allocation under section 482,97 the court reviewed the Second Circuit's
decision in the Forman case and concluded:
With due respect, we are of the opinion that -the Second Circuit has in-
correctly delineated both the purpose of section 482 and the circum-
stances required before the statute can operate. Hence, we opt to fol-
low the interpretation of the intent and usage of section 482 expressed
in previous Tax Court opinions on this issue.98
The court then set forth its opinion on the section's purpose and the proper
circumstances calling for its operation.99 The court found the interest income
90. The taxpayer had met his burden of proof as to these funds. 58 T.C. at 490.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 491; see notes 70-73 supra.
93. The court in Kerry referred to the example in Huber dealing with income re-
alized from the "use or consumption" of the goods transferred and indicated that the
Kerry case was the type of situation previously envisioned. 58 T.C. at 491; see notes
71-72 supra.
94. 58 T.C. at 491; see notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
95. 58 T.C. at 493-94; see notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
96. 58 T.C. at 494.
97. Id. at 506.
98. Id. at 508.
99. The court stated: "The test is not simply whether or not correlative adjustments
have been made to properly show the true taxable income of all the related parties con-
cerned. Rather, the question which must be asked is whether or not an item exists, re-
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could not be allocated to the Kahler Corporation as it was created solely by
application of the regulations and did not result from the transactions them-
selves. 100  This use of the regulations was found to be clearly beyond the
intent of Congress and an abuse of the Commissioner's discretion.' 0'
Judge Featherston dissented from the majority's holding in Kerry'02 and
again in Kahler for the reasons set forth in his Kerry dissent. 10 3  He agreed
with the Second Circuit's decision in the Forman case and felt it was not
sufficiently distinguished by the majority. The regulations were, to him at
least, consistent with section 482 and inconsistent with any kind of tracing
theory. The tracing concept would, in Judge Featherston's opinion, place
"a premium on accounting sophistication and lays a 'trap' for the unwary.' 10 4
He argued that by simply investing interest-free funds, borrowed from its par-
ent, in nonproductive assets, a subsidiary could use its own capital for produc-
tive purposes and yet avoid the section's application. 105 Thus, while the Tax
Court continued to reject the Commissioner's arguments, it became clear the
Commissioner was determined to resolve the issue in his favor.
C. The Circuits' Response
The Kahler case was appealed by the Commissioner on the basis of the
decision by the Second Circuit in Forman and that his allocation was neces-
sary and proper under section 482 and its regulations clearly to reflect the
income of the Kahler Corporation.'0 6 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit made particular note of the fact that the lack of an interest charge
in this case to the subsidiaries was obviously to Kahler's advantage from a
tax standpoint.107
alized out of the particular transaction between the related entities, which has been im-
properly deflected to the wrong entity." Id. at 510.
100. The court noted that the subsidiaries unquestionably put the funds to produc-
tive use but the Commissioner had failed to make any allocation of the subsidiaries' in-
come in the years in question. The Commissioner asserted that the income allocated
would have been realized had the parties been dealing at arm's length. But to this as-
sertion the court said:
The legislative history of section 482 does not reveal in any respect a
congressional intent to require an arm's-length charge on an interest-free
loan between related parties where an improper deflection of income is not
factually substantiated. Absent a declared congressional purpose in sec-
tion 482 to this end, the imposition of such a charge without the deflection
of realized income within the group would be tantamount to an unrea-
sonable check on the mere existence of common control or ownership.
Id. at 511.
101. The court indicated it was the responsibility of Congress to impute interest
charges on loans between related entities rather than the Treasury's through its regula-
tions. Citing §§ 483 and 1232, the court referred to the Internal Revenue Code's provi-
sions for "imputing" income in specific situations where Congress felt it necessary. 58
T.C. at 511. Section 483 requires the imputation of interest in deferred installment sales
situations, where none is otherwise provided for. Section 1232 requires a ratable portion
of an original issue discount on a bond to be included in the income of the holder each
year.
102. 58 T.C. at 494.
103. Id. at 512.
104. Id. at 495.
105. He also stated that perhaps the best solution would be to declare the regulations
invalid in the expectation that Congress would then focus on the problem. 58 T.C. at
496. See notes 57 and 66 supra.
106. 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 58 T.C. 496 (1972).
107. Kahler was borrowing funds at rates in excess of 5% and loaning a portion of
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The court found the Commissioner's allocation to be consistent with the
regulations and therefore the question presented was "whether or not the
regulation is unreasonable or clearly inconsistent with the statute."' 0  The
court quoted from the Second Circuit's opinion in Forman which held the
regulation was reasonable and "entirely consistent with the scope and pur-
pose of §482."109 The court also adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning as
to the Commissioner's authority to create income where none in fact existed.
The arm's length standard was affirmed and the Tax Court's tracing concept
was rejected as totally lacking any legislative support and in fact, being of
no importance at all. 110 Noting that through interest-free loans from Kahler
to its subsidiaries while it in turn was taking interest deductions on its own
indebtedness to its lenders, a substantial tax savings was effected, the court
said: "it is difficult -to imagine a situation in which Section 482 would be
more applicable on either an equitable or a legal basis.""'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kerry con-
sidered and rejected the taxpayer's contention that -the regulations under
which the Commissioner's allocations were made were not authorized or
proper under a correct construction of section 482.112 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's judgment insofar as the Commissioner's allocations
had been allowed, and reversed the Tax Court and required an allocation
of income with regard to the loan which the Tax Court felt the taxpayer
had shown to be unproductive of any gross income in the subsidiary. The
court indicated its concurrence with Judge Featherston's dissenting opinion
and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Kahler, and further noted that "[a]ny
scheme which permits related entities to regulate their tax obligations by
transfer and retransfer of monies between themselves should be carefully
scrutnized.' 1  The Ninth Circuit joined the Eighth Circuit in rejecting the
tracing concept," 4 and allowed allocations by the Commissioner under the
section 482 regulations. In so holding, the court was in accord with the
Second Circuit's Forman decision, 115 and the three circuits thus presented a
unanimous response to the Tax Court's decisions on the question.
these funds to its subsidiaries interest-free. Kahler deducted the interest payments
from its 48% tax bracket income. The interest allocated to Kahler from the sub-
sidiaries would also be taxed at Kahler's 48% rate, but the interest deduction to the
subsidiaries would have been largely offsetting income in the 22% tax bracket.
108. 486 F.2d at 4. The court said: "Treasury regulations constitute contemporane-
ous construction by those charged with administration of these statutes and should not
be overruled except for weighty reasons." Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. The court felt the proof that the funds actually produced income was of no im-portance and related the use of money in many corporations to the use of raw materials
within a manufacturing concern. This would seem to reemphasize Judge Featherston's
argument that money is actually a fungible commodity and the tracing theory would
leave an irrational test for the application of the section as well as a loophole Congress
could not have intended. See notes 102-05 supra and accompanying text.
111. 486F.2dat5.
112. CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (74-2, at 84,606) 9522(9th Cir., June 6, 1974).
113. Id. at 84,607.
114. See note 110 supra.




When the Second Circuit upheld the Commissioner's creation of interest
income in Forman1 6 it was thought appeal might be had to the United States
Supreme Court on the basis of the conflict then existing between the Sixth
Circuit, which had decided the Tennessee-Arkansas case, and the Second Cir-
cuit."17 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Forman, however, 118 and
some commentators advanced the notion that this may have been because
no real split existed. The Commissioner made a correlative adjustment to
the borrowing corporation in the Forman case and the borrower did in fact
have gross income for the year in question. In addition, the Commissioner
was acting under regulations issued for the application of section 482. In
Tennessee-Arkansas it was never shown that the subsidiary had any income
during the year in question and no corresponding adjustment was made by
the Commissioner. Regulations were also lacking in that case.
The decisions in Kahler and Kerry by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits would
certainly lend credence to this argument and the impending doom of such
intercompany transactions' tax benefits in the future. The Tax Court, set
as it is against the Commissioner's per se creation of income, will now have
to recognize the validity of the regulations authorizing such power in at least
three circuits."19
The decision in the Kerry case may have eliminated any remaining vestiges
of support the taxpayer had in the Tax Court.' 20 The potential conflict upon
which an appeal to the Supreme Court might have been predicated-that
the Commissioner could not exercise his full authority under section 482's
regulations where the taxpayer establishes that the funds were used for non-
productive purposes-was eliminated by the Ninth Circuit's disavowal of the
116. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
117. See Loening, Section 482 Allocations Resulting in the Creation of Income or
in Constructive Dividends to Shareholders, N.Y.U. 30TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1247, 1259
(1972).
118. 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
119. In Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
the taxpayer, a consumer finance company, would loan borrowed funds to its subsidiar-
ies, charging interest only to its solvent subsidiaries in amounts necessary to cover its
own interest expense. A district court within the Eighth Circuit found the Commis-
sioner had ignored "the substance of the group relationship and imputed income where
an objective analysis of the group business discloses that none had been realized." Id.
at 165. The court disallowed the interest allocation as producing a wholly fictitious re-
sult. This decision, however, upon appeal to the Eighth Circuit which had already de-
cided the Kahler case against the Tax Court, was reversed. The Eighth Circuit treated
each subsidiary's loan as a separate transaction and the Commissioner's imputation of
interest income on each loan to the insolvent subsidiaries was allowed. CCH 1974
STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (74-1, at 84,263) 9474 (8th Cir., May 31,
1974).
120. In two recent decisions, the Tax Court followed its theory of tracing and its
requirement of clearly distorted income. An allocation was allowed in Fitzgerald Motor
Co., 60 T.C. 957 (1973), to reflect arm's length interest charges on interest-free loans
between sister corporations. The court again rejected the Commissioner's contention
that section 482 empowered him to impute interest income regardless of the use of the
funds, but in accord with Kerry allowed the charge in this case since the lender failed
to show the loans did not generate income. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
determination as to a deficiency resulting from the allocation of income between the two
commonly controlled corporations, in Palo Alto Town & Country Village, 32 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1048 (1973). This was a clear case, however, of two related corporations
attempting to shift their income through a purchase and sale-back of timber by an air-
line from and to the taxpayer construction company.
1974]
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Tax Court's tracing concept. The circuit's response to the allocation issue
thus far clearly eliminates -the obvious loopholes envisioned by Judge Feather-
ston in his dissent to Kerry and makes unnecessary' 21 the congressional
action called for by many commentators.
121. See Nauheim, B. Forman & Co., Inc.-A Crucial Test of the Future of Section
482, 26 TAX LAw. 107 (1972).
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